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This thesis examine opportunities for the application of information technology
through mathematical modeling and design of a new method of a ship's space monitoring
for the support of command decisions during a fire aboard. Thesis analyzes peculiarities
of a fire and difficulties inherent in gathering data, particularly the lack of objective
information about a fire scale, fire dynamics, and timing of functioning the ship's
equipment during an emergency aboard. It was shown that, in a closed compartment, a
gas pressure monitoring is a very perspective way of determining a fire scale and its
propagation ability.
The appropriate models of fire development were created. They were designed in
a way of using only those data that were possible to observe during a fire aboard.
Depending on availability and quality of current information about the fire, an
informative tree of alternative scenarios of the fire hazard analysis and command
decisions was developed.
Conducted in terms of decision theory concept, formalization of fire-fighting
procedure permitted to accomplish structural and cost benefit analysis of the command
decisions during a fire aboard. Relevant chronological decision tree diagrams were
designed. Structural analysis proved that application of information technology and new
method of gas pressure monitoring significantly increases efficiency of command
decisions during a fire without considerable additional costs.
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I. PECULIARITIES OF A FIRE EMERGE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN A
SHIPS COMPARTMENT
A. MAIN PECULIARITIES OF A FIRE ABOARD
Fire aboard any autonomous object, such as a ship or submarine, is a very
dangerous emergency which has some specific features and peculiarities. These
peculiarities mostly depend on the structure of a ship's compartments and equipment
(apparatuses) located within them. The main peculiarities are comparatively small free
volume of compartments that are heavily overloaded by the equipment, physical
separation of a ship's compartments from the earth's atmosphere, comparatively high
probability of the flame ignition and a fire emerge aboard. Let's discuss these
peculiarities in detail.
First, design of a ship 's compartments and their overloading by the equipment.
Compartments of a ship (especially, combat ships) are rather complicated engineering
constructions heavily overloaded by equipment and ship's apparatuses. Such overloading
is necessary in order to reduce excessive buoyancy of a surface ship (for reduction of its
surface measurements and increase of a combat vulnerability). Overloading by an
equipment is much more important for submarines whose buoyancy should be so tiny for
a fast submerging and hence providing their stealth. However, an equipment overloading
worsens a fire safety of ships because it complicates a fire detection and fire suppression.
In fact, overloading of a ship's compartment does not permit to apply the major fire-
extinguishing means that are efficient in the case of direct delivering fire-extinguishing
agent to the combustion zone. Fire detection is worsened because of low visibility
through a firing compartment. Overloading causes lack of ventilation within a
compartment; therefore, even a small flame produces so much smoke that causes further
decrease of visibility and opportunity to detect and estimate actual scale of a fire.
Second, separation of a ship compartment gas milieu from the earth's
atmosphere. The main factors, which determine a fire dynamics and its development, are
oxygen concentration and gas pressure within ship's compartment. Because the milieu of
a compartment might be separated from the earth's atmosphere, oxygen concentration
and gas pressure can be different from regular values. So, fire dynamics can also be
different. The bigger an oxygen concentration and gas pressure within a compartment,
then more intensive and powerful a fire, and vice versa. On the other hand, if a
compartment is closed, the oxygen concentration decreases while a fire is going. The
oxygen starvation will create a specific phenomenon called a fire self-extinguishing.
Then bigger the scale of a fire and less a free volume of a compartment, then the faster an
oxygen starvation occurs and shorter the timing of a fire development before its self-
extinguishing.
Separation of ship's compartments from the earth's atmosphere has other negative
aspects. For instance, submarines (and sometimes surface ships as well) are equipped by
special technical systems, which maintain normal atmospheric conditions within
compartments in the case of their absolute separation from the earth's atmosphere. Such
systems produce or regenerate pure oxygen to maintain regular oxygen concentration in
compartments. For this purpose, these systems might use special chemicals that are
extremely dangerous because of their flammability. Though these chemicals are kept on
submarines with great care, they can induce catastrophic circumstances in the case of
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direct flame or heat impact and truly after the touch with water. The fatal fire accident
with the Soviet submarine Komsomolets is an example of such kind of catastrophe.
Because the level of ignition (the initiation of flaming combustion) of materials
strongly depends on the oxygen concentration, the autonomy and atmospheric separation
of ship's compartments increase the likelihood of a fire emerge. It sometimes takes place
as a result of loosing the control of the atmospheric conditions in compartments and
particularly as a result of the oxygen concentration increase more than regular meanings
(in the earth's atmosphere, the mass oxygen concentration, x=0.232). For example,
according to [Nilsen, et al., 1997], one of the possible reasons for the fire on the Soviet
submarine Komsomolets (April, 1989) was "the concentration of oxygen in the seventh
compartment [that] was too high, setting off short circuits in the electrical
system," [Nilsen, etal., 1997, p.4].
Third, comparatively high probability of the flame ignition and a fire emerge
aboard. In addition to a possibility of the excessive oxygen concentration in
compartments, a comparatively high level of probability of the flame ignition and a fire
emerge is determined by the high concentration of electrical and heat production
equipment within ship's compartments. High density of locating the electrical equipment
with comparatively big electrical voltage and power creates considerable value of the
total electrical capacity of a ship. Such a situation objectively creates conditions for high
probability of electrical shorts and hence fire ignitions. Heat production equipment (first
of all the elements of the ship's power plant that are usually located so tightly), also
increases a probability of fire ignition because of the total high temperature surface of
this equipment.
Some of the ship's technical systems might be potentially dangerous with respect
to a fire ignition and its development. For instance, air pressure systems of submarines
that are necessary not only for merging /submerging the vessel, but also for supporting
the functions of the ship's equipment and maintaining normal atmospheric conditions
aboard, are dangerous because these systems are potential oxygen suppliers for the fire in
the case of their damage. According to the analysis of the fire accident with the Soviet
submarine Komsomolets [Nilsen, et al., 1997], the main reason of catastrophic
circumstances of the fire was the damage of the high-pressure air system of the
submarine and uncontrollable supply of the fresh air into the accidental burning
compartment. Such a situation created the fatal conditions for two reasons. First, the
accidental compartment was considerably pressurized by the high-pressure air system. It
significantly amplified the scale and intensity of the combustion process and did not
allowed to implement efficiently the system of fire suppression. Secondly, a permanent
supply of the fresh air maintained perfect conditions for the keeping the fire development
that finally destroyed the pressure hull of the submarine and caused it to sunk.
Finally, the high probability of a fire emerge on a ship is determined by the
presence of own different types of weapons aboard and possibility to be attacked by an
enemy weapons.
All of the above shows that a fire on a ship has happened as a result of the
objectives that can not be eliminated; therefore, fire occurred in the past, they have been
taken place now, and they definitely will happen in the future.
B. VARIATIONS OF PRINCIPAL PARAMETERS OF A COMPARTMENT
MILIEU WITH TIME AND THEIR IMPACT ON PEOPLE AND
EQUIPMENT DURING A FILE ABOARD
Despite of the fact that each fire is a rather complicated physical phenomenon that
depends on tremendous number of different random and nonrandom factors, it is possible
to subscribe its principal parameters and their impact on people and equipment. The
principal parameters of the fire that might influence on people and equipment of ship are
fire fume, high temperature, oxygen concentration, and concentrations of gases produced
as a result a combustion chemical reaction (such as carbon dioxide, CO2, carbon
monoxide, CO, and others). As an example, Figure 1 represents variations of principal
parameters of milieu with time during a free fire development within a closed
compartment of ship. (Free fire development means that none fire suppression means are
implemented; therefore, the fire develops free until self-extinguishing because of oxygen
starvation). According to Drysdale (1992) and Astapenko et al. (1988), an entire fire
process may be divided into three periods. (1) a period of fire expansion, (2) a period of
quasi-stability, and (3) a period of extinguishing.
An expansion period of fire development can be going on from few seconds to
several hours. It depends on concrete physical conditions of milieu and type of burning
materials. Sometimes, this period in its turn might be divided into ignition phase (which
starts from heating and thermal decomposition and ends an ignition of fuel (a flame
appearance) and a fire expansion phase itself (when a flame begins to spread out
involving more and more burning materials into a combustion process). An ignition
phase is usually happens without considerable change of temperature and gas
concentrations of a compartment milieu, but it can produce fumes, which might be an
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objective signal of the beginning of the fire. A fire expansion phase is much more vigor
and fast than an ignition phase. It is followed by fast and considerable growth of the
scale and temperature of fire, and significant change of the gas concentrations in a
compartment (see Fig. 1). Nevertheless, this phase of a fire can be also sluggish because
of the type of burning materials and the speed of oxygen supply into the combustion
zone.
A quasi-stability period occurs when the scale of the fire (a fuel surface area, A/)
and the parameters of the compartment milieu begin to stagnate (see Fig. 1) though further
slow temperature growth in a compartment might continue. In contrast, oxygen, carbon
di- and mono oxide concentrations keep varying with almost the same speed as they did
during an expansion period. Temperature and fire stabilization (or quasi-stabilization)
happens, on the one hand, as a result of oxygen or fuel supply shortages in an accidental
compartment, on the other hand, as a result of quasi-equilibrium between fire heat energy
release into compartment and heat energy loss from the burning compartment. During
that period, an average gas temperature in a compartment can raise up to 200-300C and
more, as long as local temperatures might be 400-800C. Total duration of a quasi-
stability period is from several minutes to several hours.
An extinguishing period is a final period of a fire. It characterizes by the total
slowdown of all physic and chemical processes and temperature decrease in a
compartment as well. Lack of the oxygen or fuels causes self-extinguishing of flame;
nevertheless, a process of decomposition might take place for a long time. For closed
compartments of ships (it means there is no gas exchange between the burning
compartment and surroundings), self-extinguishing usually occurs as a result of oxygen
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starvation (when x=0.12-0. 13). Therefore, it is dangerous to open the damaged
compartment after fire extinguishing because the fresh air coming from nearby
compartments can induce backdraft.
If active means of fire suppression are used, the character of the fire development
and variations of principal parameters of the compartment milieu with time might be
completely different from the free fire development. For instance, in Fig. 1, the dotted
line shows possible variation of gas temperature with time, if the fire suppression means
was successfully used at the moment tSm From Fig. 1, can be seen that the sooner a fire
suppression means are used, the faster and more efficiently the fire will be extinguished.
C. PRINCIPAL WAYS OF FIRE SAFETY AND FIRE PROTECTION
ABOARD
All principal ways of fire safety and fire protection aboard might be divided into
two groups: constructive and organizational. The purpose of constructive ways is to
provide fire safety and fire protection of a ship by means of specific ship's design
solutions and technical fire detection/suppression systems. Organizational ways are those
which based on specific actions of a ship's crew to prevent initiation a fire, and, if a fire
occurs, these actions are conducted to prevent the propagation and suppress the fire.
1. Constructive ways
They can be also divided into two main groups. Passive constructive ways is the
first group that includes next technical and ship's design solutions:
• dividing a ship's hull into water-and gas-tight compartments. Such a
design solution means that an entire hull of a ship (submarine) can be
quickly separated onto several water- and gas-tight compartments by
means of special doors and hatches (see, for example, Figure 2). From the
point of view of fire protection, this measure helps to prevent smoke
(fume) propagation and suppress the fire because of oxygen starvation in a
damaged compartment.
• technical systems of fire detection. A fire detection system is a device that
gives a warning when fire occurs in the area protected by the device. It
includes one or more detectors, relays the alarm to those endangered by
the fire or those responsible for fire-fighting operations. The detection
system can also activate fire-extinguishing equipment. The types of fire
detection systems approved for use aboard ship include the following
[O'Neill et al., 1975]:
Automatic fire detection systems
Manual fire alarm systems
Smoke detection systems
Watchmen's supervisory system
Combinations of the above
Active constructive ways of fire safety and fire protection include such technical
devices and systems that are directly used for fire suppression or prevention of the fire
propagation. All these devices and systems can be distinguished by the type of
extinguishing agent or by the size of a device (system) and its extinguishing power.
Eight extinguishing agents are in common use. Each is applied to the fire as a liquid, gas
or solid, depending on its extinguishing action and physical properties. Because an
efficient use of each agent depends on the class offire, we shall briefly discuss these
classes. For fire-fighting purposes, there are fife fire classes [O'Neill et al., 1975; Gates,
1987]:
• Class A fires (common flammable solid fuel)
• Class B fires (flammable liquid or gaseous fuel)
• Class C fires (electrical equipment)
• Class D fires (combustible-metal fuel)
• Class F fires (fuels that do not need an external oxidation material for a
combustion process: missile's fuel, gunpowder, chemicals for atmospheric
regeneration, etc.)
The most popular extinguishing agents are [O'Neill et al., 1975; Gates, 1987]:
• Liquids: water spray; foam.
• Gases: carbon dioxide (C02); halons (1211 or 1301).
• Solids (Dry Chemicals): monoammonium phosphate; bicarbonate;
potassium bicarbonate; potassium chloride.
On Figure 3, the actions of extinguishing agents on the different classes of fire are
shown [O'Neill et al., 1975].
Depending on the size and extinguishing power all fire extinguishers can be
divided on:
• Portable and Semi-portable devices (extinguishers).
• Fixed Fire-Extinguishing Systems.
Portable extinguishers can be carried to the fire area for a fast attack. However,
they contain a limited supply of extinguishing agent. In most cases, continuous
application can be sustained for only a minute or less. In fact, they are efficient for the
nascent fires with tiny scale and small fire surface area (Aj<\m2). When the fire is big or
powerful, fixed fire-extinguishing systems should be used. United States ships use seven
major types of fixed fire-extinguishing systems [O'Neill et al., 1975; Gates, 1987]:
• Fire-main systems
• Automatic and manual sprinkler systems
• Spray systems
• Foam systems
• Carbon dioxide systems
• Halon 1301/1211
• Dry chemical systems
The efficient extinguishing system is the halon system. Unfortunately, halons
have reportedly damaged the earth atmosphere; therefore, according to the Montreal
Protocol [Blackmore, 1994], all countries must stop using the halons. Though many
countries conduct research, a satisfactory substitute of the halons has not been found yet.
From the point of view the British Navy, there is currently only one other approved
extinguishing gas and that is carbon dioxide {CO2) [Blackmore, 1994], But it has major




to provide an affective extinguishing concentration. Of even greater concern is
the potential for fatalities if there are lapses in maintenance procedures or training
because of the high toxicity of carbon dioxide) [Blackmore, 1994].
In order to fight major fires, US warships are provided with three basic types of
fire-fighting systems. The first is a seawater fire main, which can feed hoses for dousing
the fire and boundary cooling which prevents the spread of fire. The foam AFFF can be
produced by using special adapters on the hoses. (AFFF cannot be used for extinguishing
fires in compartments with electrical equipment.). The second is system of fixed
pipework and nozzles, which can be automatically triggered to deliver extinguishing
agents [Gates, 1987]. The third is a halon system, which is efficient but for only closed
compartments of ships. In addition, even halon has flaws. The halon agents do not cool
so they will not prevent re-ignition of a persistent source of heat. Secondly, it is toxic;
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therefore, its implementing requires additional caution and control.
2. Organizational measures
Organizational measures offire safety aboard include specific actions of a ship's
crew to prevent initiation a fire. Such actions might be:
• special order of keeping, using, and throwing away flammable materials;
• careful organization and specific regulations for conducting any activity
which deals with an open flame (welding works, smoking of personnel,
etc.);
• clear individual duty and responsibility of each member of a crew for
maintenance of fire safety conditions in each ship's compartment and
working place, for obeying fire safety order during routine business
aboard, etc.
Organizational measures of fire protection are specific chain of command and
actions of a ship's crew when a fire occurs. The main peculiarity of the chain of
command when a fire occurs is extreme simplicity and centralization. Both elements of
this organizational structure are necessary because the fire-fighting actions must be
conducted fast and vigorously. Efficiency of these actions would greatly depend on
quick informative feedback between commanding officer (CO) of a ship who is
responsible for fire-fighting command decisions and all members of a crew who must
conduct fire-fighting actions. It is obviously, that fast and vigorous actions of a crew
during a fire-fighting procedure are impossible without special preliminary training of
personnel. Such training is usually conducted at special training places that are able to
create real fire environment aboard or directly on a ship as well (in the second case, only
organizational aspects and elements of fire-fighting procedure are repeated). During
training, personnel of a ship exercises next basic elements of fire-fighting procedure:
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• extinguishing fires of different classes (usually, A, B, and C classes);
• using different types of fire means and fire-protection equipment;
• actions of special teams for inspecting a burning (or after-burning
compartment).
In addition to the training of fire-fighting personnel in real fire conditions at the
special training centers, a virtual reality technology has begun to use for fire-fighting
training for the last few years [Tatem and Tate, 1996]. A new technology-virtual reality-
can be used as a means for damage control training without costly live fires. In this
application, a human operator can be immersed in a realistic but virtual environment to
develop damage control skills without safety and environmental concerns [Tatem and
Tate, 1996]. "Virtual environment (VE) training can bridge the gap very effectively
between the classroom and the live trainer. VE can provide the opportunity in individual
and team training for exposure to unlimited fires, to study the fire physics of each, and to
evaluate the damage control options than can be taken."[Tatem and Tate, 1996].
Among compulsory training elements, there is a training of special team that must
be ready to inspect the damaged compartment after fire termination or even accomplish a
fire-fighting procedure within a burning compartment [Blackmore, 1994]. This tough
rigorous procedure for sending a man-team into a damaged compartment has been existed
in the British Navy [Blackmore, 1994] and in navies of other countries including Russia.
This measure has been necessary to gain more information within a compartment where a
fire sensor had triggered [Blackmore, 1994], or to exam damaged compartments in order
to recognize the exact location of the source of a fire and its scale. Such a rigorous
procedure is a signal that nowadays fire safety and fire protection systems of the warships
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are not absolutely effective and are not able to relinquish direct participation of
manpower in the process of early estimating and extinguishing a fire.
D. RECENT EFFORTS:
1. IT Applications
Over the dates, advantages of the modern information technology (IT) have begun
to be used for fire protection of ships. "Information display and distribution is necessary
to pass damage control information between a number of operating positions throughout
a ship and to ensure it may be displayed when and where required." [Blackmore, 1994,
p. 1 15]. According to [Blackmore, 1994], the British Navy is developing Damage Control
Information Displays (DCID). These provide a full ship-wide electronic incident board
and information display network. It is considered that such a system would gather
information from the sensors in order not only to recognize the fact of a fire, but also to
perform "rapid discrimination between compartments on fire and those, which are simply
smoke logged."[Blackmore, 1994, p. 1 1 5]. The authors hope that this new information
system permits to abolish participating personnel in a process of inspecting the incident
compartments for providing real information about the scale and extent of the fire and
making command decision of the fire-fighting. However, from the [Blackmore, 1994], it
is not clear how the authors of this new information system are supposed to achieve their
goal, because, among possible sensors that a new system will includes, they named
traditional sensors of smoke, heat, and flame detection. These sensors and systems,
which use their information, can help to provide atmospheric monitoring in damaged
compartments. But it will be require tremendous amount of the sensors that must be
placed in each comparatively autonomous space of a compartment or even in each
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electrical cabinet and any other apparatus, which is potentially flammable. In addition,
such a damage control information system will need corresponding complicated software
in order to deal with so voluminous volume of original information. Finally, because of
complexity, a DCIS would be cumbersome and expensive technical structure.
In addition to the DCIS, it is believed that greater use of closed circuit television
should be useful for fire-fighting analysis and command decision process. According to
[Blackmore, 1994], this TV system will enable the ship's Command to evaluate the
situation first hand and prioritize their approach. However, from our point of view,
potential benefits of using a TV system are doubtful because of smoke and hence low
visibility within damaged compartments and high vulnerability of the elements of a TV
system with respect to heat of a fire.
2. Modeling
As long as damage control information systems (DCIS) have are used, a fire
preliminary analysis of sensors' information, estimating, and even predicting fire
development aboard have begun to develop as well. Fire models may be divided into two
basic groups: (1) probabilistic fire models (see, for example, Watts, 1991) and (2)
deterministic fire models. Both of them in their turn can be subdivided into different
types depending on the physical conditions and place where a fire occurs and depending
on the practical goal that this type of model should achieve. However, barely any fire
models have been developed for using in DCIS for estimating and prediction of an
actually developing fire aboard. The main reason is that the current deterministic fire
models have been developed on the assumption that the information about original
parameters of fire is available. Specifically, these deterministic models have taken as
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given such original parameters of fire as fire flame (pool) area, location of the source of
flame in a compartment, the types of currently burning materials, etc. Current models
can be used for DCIS, if we know the original parameters of a fire that, in our case, are
barely might be estimated by the standard means (for example, by using fire detection
sensors or by personnel report). Thus, current models should be modified in a way to use
only that objective information which can be actually received from the damaged
compartment. Or, we have to find new sources and methods of deriving an objective
current data of a fire development.
E. PROBLEMS OF COMMAND DECISION PROCESS DURING A FIRE
ABOARD
A commanding officer (CO) who must directly manage a fire-fighting process
often has difficulties with respect to objective analysis of a current situation on a ship
and, particularly, in damaged compartments. Oral reports of the crew members, on the
one hand, and current data from many a ship's information systems (including DCIS), on
the other, can create a contradictory picture that a CO cannot digest correctly in order to
make command decisions. Moreover, despite the volume of current information that
overloads a CO and his staff, the most important data about the fire development (scale,
exact location, timing) and efficiency of conducted fire suppression actions are usually
absent.
The effectiveness of a command decision process during a fire aboard depends on
four factors:
• Factor 1. Objective current information about the fire development, its
scale, location, timing, and possible scale the ship's damages;
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• Factor 2. Information about ship's apparatuses and their working
capabilities;
• Factor 3. Information about actual current actions of a crew in an
emergency (damaged) and undamaged compartments of ship;
• Factor 4. Personal performance experience of a commanding officer (CO)
to estimate, predict a current situation aboard, and to make managerial
decisions.
Factors 2 and 3 are usually implemented satisfactorily. Factor 4 is rather
subjective and depends on human and psychological peculiarities of a CO; therefore, it
cannot be considerably changed. So, the main problem is factor 1 because regular
manners of gathering information during a fire emerge and development is an oral report
of personnel (by means of telecommunication materiel) to a CO. This manner is
ineffective and mostly subjective. Due to lack of timing, personnel are usually not able
to report their current actions and barely able to observe any objectives of fire
development and scale of damage; therefore, these reports are scarcely helpful and often
distort the real situation on a ship. Though modern ships might be equipped by special
technical systems of detecting a fire and monitoring atmospheric conditions (we
discussed this issue before), this information is usually so great, uncoordinated, and
messy that a CO and a ship's crew aren't able to use it efficiently in order to suppress a
fire and make other managerial decisions.
A good example of ineffective command decision process can represent the fatal
incident with the Soviet submarine Komsomolets. At the beginning, nobody could learn
the actual scale and power of the fire though the CO had received a report from a sailor
that a fire had started. The CO also received information from the special ship's
monitoring system about high atmospheric temperature within an accidental
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compartment. Not knowing the real scale and power of the fire, the CO ordered the
implementation of regular procedures of fire inspection in order to choose a proper means
of fire suppression. It was a mistake that worsened the situation. Valuable time was
wasted, the fire was not suppressed, and finally, the submarine sank. The majority of the
crew died either during fire fighting aboard or in the cold water of the sea after the
submarine catastrophe [Nilsen, et al., 1997].
F. OBJECTIVES (REASONING FOR RESEARCH)
First, despite of significant development and use new methods and means of fire
detection and suppression, fires aboard have continued to occur during peaceful time, and
they will definitely happen during warfare activities. For example, according to the
current statistics of the Royal Navy [Blackmore, 1994], on average 130 fires are reported
each year. Similar situations have taken place in other state navies because:
design of a ship's compartments and their overloading by the equipment;•
•
•
comparatively high probability of the flame ignition and a fire initiation
aboard;
location ofweapons and other materials with high level flammability.
low visibility within compartments as a result heavy smoking at the very
beginning of a fire.
Second, separation of a ship compartment gas milieu (that is common for
submarines) causes some specific feature of a fire development which complement
difficulties of the fire detection, estimating, and suppression the fire: possibility of
increase gas pressure and oxygen concentration within a damaged compartment,
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significant smoking, and difficulties of evacuation the crew from the damaged
compartments.
Third, despite of considerable progress with respect to implementation of
information technology (IT) for monitoring and estimating the fire and atmospheric
conditions aboard, some key-parameters of the fire such as its scale, fire pool area
(current surface area of the burning materials) cannot be determined by the usual fire
detection sensors. Therefore, severe procedure of visual inspection of a damaged
compartment by the personnel has still taken place.
Fourth, nowadays mathematical models of fire development are barely useful for
implementation in damage control information systems (DCIS), because they have been
developed on the assumption that all original parameters of a fire are known. But, in
many cases, preliminary knowledge of these parameters is questionable. Thus, it is quite
necessary to develop a model, which will use those parameters that can be currently
measured or estimated during a fire aboard.
Fifth, a commanding officer (CO) has difficulties while he makes command
decision during fire-fighting actions, and sometimes these decisions are not efficient and
prominent. It has happened as a result of inability to estimate real scale and scenario
(picture) of the fire development; therefore, a CO cannot forecast actual hazard of fire
and make efficient command decisions. Because of shortage of objective information, a
CO and the crew spend too much time for dangerous inspection of a damaged
compartment and indirect evaluation of the fire parameters. It decreases an efficiency of
a fire-fighting procedure and sometimes leads to fatal circumstances.
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Sixth, the main goal of our research is to examine opportunities for the
application of information technology (IT) through modeling and structural analysis for
supporting command decisions during a fire within closed compartment of ship.
Specifically, our research questions and tasks are:
• To examine traditional and nontraditional objective parameters of a
compartment atmosphere that are available for measuring and using for
fire estimation and fire modeling in closed compartment of ship.
• To investigate an opportunity of application of the gas pressure monitoring
within damaged compartment for estimating a fire scale, its dynamics, and
timing of a free fire termination.
• To develop and discuss possible models of fire development within closed
compartment of ship, which are based on the gas pressure monitoring and
observing the other available parameters of the atmosphere within
damaged compartment. (To develop informative tree of monitoring and
hazard analysis during a fire aboard.)
• To examine possible alternative scenarios of estimating a fire scale and
command decisions for fire suppression. (Actual chronological tree of the
events and command decisions during a fire aboard.)
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H. THE GAS PRESSURE MONITORING ABOARD IS AS A NEW MANNER OF
FIRE HAZARD ESTIMATING FOR COMMAND DECISIONS DURING A
FIRE FIGHTING ABOARD
In chapter I, it was shown that monitoring regular atmospheric parameters (gas
temperature, concentrations of different specific gases) throughout the space of an
accidental compartment of ship is not quite efficient way to estimate such important
characteristics of fire development as the fire scale, fire pool area, and timing of self-
extinction of fire within closed compartment. The main reason is space unevenness of a
temperature and gas concentrations' fields throughout a compartment that requires
considerable amounts of temperature and gas concentrations' sensors and complicated
technique of the data interpretation. Therefore, in this chapter, a new indirect method of
estimating a fire pool area, scale, and timing of fire development in a closed compartment
will be discussed. Developed in Reference [Nikitin, 1998a], this new method is based on
measuring and monitoring average gas pressure in an accidental compartment that is
much more efficient and productive with respect not only necessary amounts of gas
pressure sensors, but an opportunity of estimating and predicting a fire development and
fire termination as well.
A. ESTIMATING AND PREDICTING A FH*E POOL AREA BY
MONITORING GAS PRESSURE IN A CLOSED COMPARTMENT OF A
SHIP
Fire pool area is one of the most important features of a fire in closed
compartments of ships. Estimation of the fire area is important because it permits to
choose effective method of extinguishing fire or to apply mathematical fire modeling
which is usually based on knowledge of the fire pool area as one of the original
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parameters. However, such estimation when an actual fire occurs is a difficult task. For
example, if a fire occurs on a ship (submarine) those compartments are heavily occupied
by equipment, it's very difficult or even impossible to determine the flame (fire pool)
area and, consequently, to estimate the actual scale and potential danger of the fire for the
ship and its crew. On the other hand, estimating the fire pool area (and other parameters
of a fire as well) by measuring the temperature (or gas concentrations') fields is rather
complicated and barely reasonable task because these unsteady fields are so irregular and
uneven through the space of a fire closed compartment. So the measuring these fields
requires a lot of temperature and gas concentration sensors that should be installed
throughout the entire compartment. At the same time, it is well known that a gas pressure
and its variations during a fire development are much more regular throughout the space
of a closed compartment. So, measuring the gas pressure and applying these data for
estimating and predicting a fire development within a closed compartment looks much
attractive.
Nikitin (1998a) proposed an indirect method of estimating the fire pool area was
proposed. This method is based on correlation between the fire pool area and the rate of
gas pressure increase within a closed compartment during the first period of the fire
development.
B. PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENT AND RELEVANT THEORY OF FIRE
POOL ESTEVLAING BY THE GAS PRESSURE MONITORING
Analysis of experimental data shows some correlation between the fire pool area
and variation of gas pressure within a closed compartment. For instance, during
experiments with the fires conducted by the author of this paper, it was noticed that, at
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the beginning a fire development (while the average temperature (gas pressure) in a
compartment raise up), the bigger fire pool area, ASi induces a larger rate of the air
pressure increase, p , in a closed fire compartment. As a result, we decided to
investigate this phenomenon by means of the special full-scale tests performed in the
closed steel compartment at the Naval Research Laboratory (Sevastopol, Ukraine).
In that compartment (the internal volume, P=46m3 ), six distinct test series were
conducted. The burning material was diesel fuel placed on the liquid (or fire) pool with
constant area (A s=0.22 m ). Every test seria was different from others with respect to the
liquid pool location in the compartment. From one test seria to another, we changed the
clearance between the liquid pool and the ceiling, /, and the distances between the liquid
pool and the walls of the compartment. We also changed the amount of equipment
placed in the compartment to alter the total area of the heat-transfer surface between the
fire and the walls (constructions) of the compartment.
The most interesting results of these experiments are represented on Figure 4.
From this figure, we may see that variation of the average air (gas) pressure of the
compartment with time during fire development significantly depends on the location of
the fire pool and the amount of the equipment (the surface area of the compartment). At
the same time, during the first period of the fire development (in our experiments, it was
50-60 s), maximum rate of the air pressure increase, pm , for every test seria is
approximately the same. (See also, Table 1, columns 1-6). The most interesting example
is comparison the first test seria (when the fire pool was placed on the central point of the
floor and /=1.35m) and the fourth test seria (the liquid pool was in the steel tube so that
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the flame of the fire didn't radiate to the compartment walls and ceiling). For these two
series, though entire behaviors of the air pressure variations with time are very distinct
(see Fig. 4), and the biggest air pressures are significantly different (p=S*\05 Pa and
16*105Pa, accordingly), the maximum rates of air pressure increase are approximately
equal (p m =\56 Pa/s and 177 Pa/s). This phenomenon and such comparable maximum
rate of the air pressure increase might be explained in terms of heat transfer between the
fire flame and the constructions' surface of the compartment.
To explain this phenomenon, we suggested that during the first period of the fire
development, heat transfer happens mostly by means of the heat radiation from the fire
flame to the constructions' (or equipment's) surface of the compartment. At the same
time, the portion of the heat transfer by convection is insignificant. Let's see this idea in
details. For the closed compartments (that means there is no gas exchange between the
firing compartment and surrounding area), the basic equation of energy balance is
[Astapenko et al., 1988]:
V^-(7R-) = m77H + hg m-0„ (2.1)dx k-l
It was shown in the paper [Astapenko at al., 1988] that ratio of specific heats, A:, has very
small variations with time during the fire. In addition, enthalpy of the fuel vapor, h
,
can






where m s is mass combustion rate per unit of the fire pool area, and K is combustion
efficiency coefficient which depends on the ratio between actual surface area of the
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burning fuel and the flame projection area on a floor of a compartment, A s . (For example,
for liquid fuels, both areas are the same; therefore, K=\).
In this equation, total heat, Ow, transferred from the fire to the constructions of
compartment (walls, ceiling, floor, equipment, etc.) usually consists of two main parts:
radiation from the fire flame, Of, and convection from the heated air (gases) to the walls,
Qc- As we noticed before, during the first period of the fire development, we may neglect
the convection portion of heat transfer, Oc . Otherwise, we would have suggested that Qc
and its variations with time during the fire did not depend on the location of the fire pool
and did not depend on the value of the heat-transfer area between the hot gas layer and
the surface of a compartment (constructions) that is obviously incorrect. Consequently,
Q»*Qf (2-3)
For fires in closed compartments, heat transferred to the constructions by means of flame




where £ —mutual emissivity determined as:
S = 1/(1/^ + 1/^-1) (2.5)
The shape factor Ff.w is defined as the fraction of total radiant energy that leaves
the flame surface and arrives directly on the constructions' surface. For the closed
compartments, it's possible to suggest that entire radiant energy of the flame arrives on
the constructions' surface; therefore,
Fjcwl (2.6)









Analysis of research papers, written by different authors, shows some strong
correlation between the fire pool area, As, and the height of the fire flame, /?/. According








If we insert equation (2.11) to (2.2), the maximum rate of the gas pressure
increase during fire will be:
'B
pm =^r[m.KT]H-16.1s(Tf nO0y]A, (2 12)
During the first period of the fire development, it is possible to suggest that the
values of m s , TJ , H, K, Tf, 8 are varied insignificantly. In other words, we may suppose
that:




where C—coefficient which is constant in time and which might be calculated for any
type of fuel (for example, by means of combustion manual):
C=l/[/w, KrjH- 16. \s(Tf /\00y] (2.15)
Thus, equation (2. 14) shows that for any type of the burning material, the fire area
is directly proportional to the maximum rate of the gas pressure increase and the volume
of the compartment.
Accuracy of the equations (2.14) and (2.15) was confirmed by different
experimental data conducted in the closed steel compartments with the volumes F=13.5,
32, 46, and 164m respectively. The burning material was diesel fuel placed on the fire
pool (which area, A s , was kept constant in each test, but changed in different seria tests
from 0. 12m to 1.8m ). These experimental data are represented on Table 1 and Figure 5.
For example, Figure 5 demonstrates the linear character of correlation between p m and
As/V. On this figure the straight line 1 was drawn by the formula
A s/V=2.27x 10"5 p m , (2.16)
that was calculated for the diesel fuel by equation (2.14) and (2.15).
C. ESTIMATING THE FIRE POOL AREA IN THE CASE OF SEVERAL
BURNING MATERIALS
During an actual fire, many different materials capable to combust might be
located in a fire compartment. Therefore, it might be impossible to recognize what exact
fuels (materials) are burning in some particular period of time during a fire development.
Such a situation is very typical for compartments of ships (submarines) where assemblies
of potentially combustible materials and constructions are located in a very small space
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of the compartment. Consequently, it is important to create some method that would be
able to estimate the fire pool area and the scale of the fire when we don't have precise
information about materials that are currently burning in a fire compartment. In order to
do that, we may use previous results and equations (2. 14) and (2.15).
First, we may prematurely analyze all materials (constructions, equipment, etc.)
located in the closed compartment and, using formulas (2.14), (2.15), to determine two of
them which have the largest, p ml and the smallest, pm meanings of the maximal rate of
the gas pressure increase at the same fire surface area, A s. Then, for these two materials,
we may draw graphs (straight lines) which reflect the values of pm versus the values
of fire pool area, A s , by means of formulas (2.14), (2.15). These two straight lines will
form a sector where the straight lines, pm = f(A), of all other burning materials will
be located. In other words, every value of the fire surface area, A Sh will consistent with
the range of the values of maximum rates of the air pressure increase, p tm , of all burning
materials, and contra versa. For example, Figure 6 represents variation of A s with the
ratio pJV in the case when the marginal materials are diesel fuel (line 2) and wood
(line 1). The majority of other ordinary carbon fuels (materials) would be located
between these two marginal straight lines. From this figure, we can also see the larger
fire pool area provides the wider range of p m and the larger error of our estimation.
However, at the same time, the larger fire area, the smaller probability that only one type
of material is currently burning; therefore, the "actual gap" between p ml and p ms might
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be much less than the original gap that had been prematurely calculated for this particular
compartment. Thus, uncertainty and the gap of the estimating the current fire pool area
(A si~Ass) by means of measuring p m might be considerably reduced. For example, in
some extent, it is possible to assume that the bigger fire pool area, the closer the "actual"
• • •
straight line p m = f(As ) to the bias within the sector p m/ — p
'
m , (orA si-A ss).
D. ESTIMATING A FERE POOL AREA IN THE CASE OF SEVERAL
CONNECTED COMPARTMENTS
In practice, at the beginning of fire development and its detection, an accidental
compartment might be unclosed; therefore, the rate of air pressure increase would be not
consistent with our premature estimation by equations (2. 14) and (2. 15). Some portion
gases will likely be transported from the accidental compartment to other, nearby
compartments. For instance, such a situation is common for a submarine, the pressure
hull of that is divided into several compartments by the gas-and watertight walls. Thus,
each compartment can be sealed and separated from the others, in the event of a fire.
However, the procedure of enclosure requires some period of time.
Let's see an example when accidental compartment has connections with two
others. All three compartments are secluded from surroundings and might be completely
sealed (separated) one from another for some short period of time. In this case, instead of
equation (2.2), the basic equation of energy balance might be represented:
V/(k-l)p = msAsKrjH-Qw -m gl cpT<a -mg2CpTa (2.17)
It's possible to suggest that, at the very beginning of fire detection and sealing the
accidental compartment, the average temperatures of air within all compartments are
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approximately even. It is also possible to assume that the energy losses of air (gases)
flowing through openings between compartments are not significant; therefore,
V
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2 p 2 )l{k-\) = m s AKr1H-Qw (2.20)
and
• • •
A=C(Vp+VlP , + V2 p 2 ) (2.21)
Following our previous reasoning and discussion, it's obvious that the fire pool
• • •
area is directly proportional to the maximum value of the sum (pV + pV
}
+ p 2 V2 ) max ;
consequently:
A=C('pV+'pK+p2 V2 )m (2.22)






+p2 V2 +... + p n VXax (2-23)
E. FIRE SCALE IS MORE UNIVERSAL AND RELEVANT FOR
ESTIMATION OF THE FIRE HAZARD
Previous experience shows that hazard evaluation of a fire by means of estimating
its fire pool area is not quite reasonable and objective because such a parameter does not
depend on the volume of the accidental compartment. Two fires that have the same fire
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pool areas will have completely different damage and hazard effects on a ship if, for
example, the free volumes of these compartments equal correspondingly 1000m3 and
50m3 .
From our point of view, there is more efficient measure of a fire hazard effect
such as the scale of the fire within a closed compartment, Sc, that might be determined as
the ratio between heat released by the fire per unit time and the volume of the accidental
compartment. In other words, the fire scale is the heat power of a fire per volume unite
of a compartment (W/m ). The most remarkable, that dimensionalities of Sc and p are
equivalent. Certainly, the dimensionality ofSc is (W/m3) while the dimensionality of gas
pressure rate is (Pa/s). But after corresponding manipulations with basic dimensions that
compose each of these parameters, it possible to show that they are absolutely identical.
Consequently, the fire scale, Sc, as the most objective parameter of the fire hazard within
might be directly determined by measuring and monitoring the rate of the gas pressure
within an accidental compartment, p , during a fire development. The fire scale, Sc, is
more universal measure then, for example, fire pool area A s because it allows to compare
the values of the fire hazards that might occur in different (in terms of the volume) ship's
compartments.
F. CONCLUSION
First, a new indirect method of estimation of a fire surface area by measuring rate
of air pressure variation was created. This method is based on the notion that, for each
burning material, there is correlation between the maximum rate of the air pressure
increase in a closed compartment and the fire pool area. Moreover, our experimental and
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theoretical research stated that this correlation has a linear character. It was also shown
that, at the first period of fire development in a closed compartment, the fire pool area is
directly proportional to the maximum rate of air pressure increase within the
compartment. Necessary formulas for calculating the fire pool area were created and
confirmed by experimental data.
Second, this new method of estimating the fire surface area can be used if a
compartment contains several different materials, and if it's impossible to determine what
type of materials are actually burning. In this case, each value of the maximum rate of
the air pressure increase p m is consistent with the range of the values of the fire pool
areas (A si-A ss). This range (gap) might be prematurely calculated for two marginal
burning materials that have the largest and the smallest heat release capacities among all
fuels located in an accidental compartment.
Third, if an accidental compartment is not completely sealed (separated) from
nearby ones, it is necessary to observe the air pressure variations within each
compartment and to use this information for the fire pool estimating. In this case, the fire
pool area is directly proportional to the maximum sum of the products of free volumes
and the rates of air pressure increase within each compartment.
Fourth, a pressure field in a closed compartment is not so irregular as the
temperature or gas concentration fields are. Therefore, measuring an average pressure
variation (or its rate) is much more reasonable and technically simple because it does not
require too many pressure sensors in a compartment.
Fifth, a gas pressure monitoring is quite efficient, reliable, and reasonable way of
estimating the fire scale for command decision during a fire aboard, particularly, for
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choosing the most efficient tool of fire suppression, fire modeling, and fire predicting.
Therefore, application of a gas pressure monitoring in board damage control information
systems (DCIS) can considerably increase their efficiency with respect the entire process
of a fire fighting procedure and command decisions.
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m. MODELS OF FIRE DEVELOPMENT WHICH MIGHT BE APPLIED IN
DAMAGE CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Analysis conducted in Chapter II has opened new opportunities of gathering
objective information about a fire emerge, its development, and termination. The most
important, monitoring the gas pressure within compartments of ship have broadened
advantages of applying fire modeling for estimating and predicting principal parameters
of the fire and evaluating the fire hazard. In this chapter, we will propose and discuss
some concrete model of fire development in a damaged compartment and possible ways
(models) of estimating the time of functioning a ship's apparatuses and equipment that is
crucially important for command decisions during fire fighting and actions that help to
rescue a damage ship and its crew.
A. MATHEMATICAL MODEL AND EQUATIONS FOR ESTIMATING AND
PREDICTING PRINCIPAL PARAMETERS OF FIRE DEVELOPMENT
WITHIN CLOSED COMPARTMENT OF SHIP
Even the most simple and approximate models of fire development assume that
we preliminary know some basic original features of the burning materials and geometry
of the damaged compartment. Among them are: type of burning materials (their initial
combustion characteristics, m, and //), a fire pool area A s , and the volume of the
compartment V. Such a minimum of information permits to design a model which is able
to estimate and predict average parameters of the temperature, gas concentration fields
during a fire. Such a sort of model for a sealed ship's compartment was developed by the
author [Nikitin, 1989]. This model was developed by means of modification of the forth
fundamental equations (energy, material, oxygen balances equations and the Clapeyron
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equation) [Astapenko,et al., 1988] for the atmosphere of the sealed firing compartment
and mathematical solution these four equations as a system [Nikitin, 1989]. As a result,
the equations that describe relations between average temperature, T, oxygen
concentration, x, the gas density p and the time of a fire development were received.
Particularly, these relations might be:
p/po =(\ + 0)/(x/xo +0) (3.1)
r/r =(l+6>)(l-6y)/[(^+^)2 ]ln{(l-^)(jc/^ +(9)/[(jc/jc -^)(l + ^)]}-
-(l-co)(l-x/x
o )/[(0 + a))(x/xo -0) (3.2)
T/T =l + (M-l)(x/x -co)/[A(l-X)(l-co)]x
x{\-[(x/x
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When the gas exchange between a damaged compartment and surroundings is
absent and there is none additional oxygen supply within the compartment, the change of




And the equations (3. l)-(3.3) might be simplified:
xlx =exp{-6> 2 (r/r
o
)/(l + 0)} (3.10)
T/T
o
=\ + M/[A(1-0/A)]{qxp[-0 2 (t/t
o )/(\ + 0)]-
-exp[-#4(r/r )/(l + <9) (3.11)
Equations (3.10) and (3.11) might be applied for approximate estimating oxygen
concentration and temperature variations during the time of a fire development in a
closed compartment.
B. MODEL OF FIRE DEVELOPMENT FOR ESTIMATING
TEMPERATURE WITHIN SPECIFIC ZONES OF A COMPARTMENT
Because of possible considerable inequality of temperature and oxygen
concentration fields through the space of a damaged compartment, the estimation and
prediction of the average parameters of a fire development might be not enough for
objective identification of the fire hazard and efficiency of the command decisions.
Therefore, it is necessary to develop some methods that are able to evaluate the
temperature distribution within space (or at least some specific zones) of the damaged
compartment. There are many types of models that are permit to estimate the
temperatures in particular zones [for example, Quintiere, 1995], but their practical
application and accuracy depend on an opportunity to receive specific initial and current
information not only about a fire pool area, types of the burning materials, but precise
place and configuration of the surface of burning materials.
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One of possible way of estimating temperature in some particular zones or points
might be next. In some extent, entire temperature field within a compartment might be
divided onto two zones (see Figure 7):
• zone of thermal impact of the fire
• zone of comparative safety.
At the first approach, it is reasonable assume that the volume of thermal zone, Vt
,
equals a current volume of atmosphere of a compartment which has already passed
through the combustion zone (a zone above a surface of the burning materials where
physical mixture between vaporized fuel and atmospheric oxygen and chemical
combustion reaction occur). In this case, it is possible to show that a current volume Vt (a
thermal zone) depends on the ratio between a current and initial oxygen average
concentrations within a compartment [Nikitin, 1989]. This correlation might be
described [Nikitin, 1989] by the next quite simple equation:
V
T
/V = \-x/x (3.12)
If we also assume that a current energy of the fire absorbed by the compartment
atmosphere has been actually distributed within the thermal zone volume, Vt , then we
may write:
V(T-T ) = VT (TT -T„) (3.13)
where TT is temperature within a thermal impact zone. In other words, the temperature










=T + T(\-x/x ) (3.15)
Thus, if we are able to estimate the average temperature variation T, we can
calculate not only the current volume, but also the temperature passage within a zone of
thermal impact [for example, by inserting equation (3. 1 1) to equation (3.15)].
C. MODELS FOR ESTIMATING AND PREDICTING THE TIMING OF
FUNCTIONING A SHD?'S APPARATUSES AND EQUIPMENT
Suppose that we can estimate and predict a temperature schedule within a closed
compartment during a fire. Now let's discuss possible and reasonable model (or method)
estimating and predicting the timing the ship's apparatuses' functioning when a fire
occurs. Such an estimating for each important ship's equipment located in a damaged
compartment can be provided based on a notion that functioning any equipment unit
(electronic cabinet, machine, or power plant apparatus) depends on a dynamic rate of a
temperature increase within this unit and gain of a critical temperature which can destroy
or malfunction their functional elements. Thus, a task of estimating the timing an
equipment unit functioning is divided onto several steps (or tasks):
First, preliminary, we have to determine what element of the equipment unit is
the most vulnerable with respect to a high temperature impact.




Third, for each important type of a ship's equipment, we have to develop an
unsteady heat-transfer model and formulas that would be able to calculate a temperature
regime of the most vulnerable elements.
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Finally, using a fire development model together with the unsteady heat-transfer
models of the equipment, we may estimate and predict the timing, r
cr ,
the equipment
functioning at some concrete moment of a fire development. For each examined
equipment unit, this timing will happen when a current temperature of a vulnerable
element becomes equal the critical temperature, T
cr
(see Figure 8).
D INFORMATIVE TREE: ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS OF
MONITORING, ESTIMATING, AND PREDICTING THE HAZARD OF
FIRE DEVELOPMENT AND THEIR APPLICATION IN DCIS
Each fire is unique with respect its duplication even at the same original
conditions and parameters. In other words, if two fires occur within the same
compartment and place, and all initial physical conditions and objectives are the same,
the actual development of each fire, in some extent, would be different. Such
unpredictability of a fire development, on the one hand, and distinctive potential
opportunities for taking objective current information about its principal parameters, on
the other, require specific methods of the fire estimating and predicting. One of the
possible ways to solve the problem of uncertainty and unpredictability of a fire
propagation throughout ship's compartments is the design of an informative tree of
possible ways offire monitoring and hazard analysis. Such a tree will provide estimating
and predicting the fire hazard depending on, first, the events that really occur during a
fire, and second, an accuracy and amounts of the initial and current objective information
about a fire development.
Our previous analysis showed, that there are few possible groups of objective
information about a fire in a compartment that might contribute for applying specific fire
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models and, consequently, might provide specific abilities to estimate and predict a fire
development and to determine particular ways of fire fighting and rescuing of ship.
Among them:
• Location of a source of a fire within a compartment (an exact cite where a
flame takes place);
• Specific type of burning materials (the knowledge of specific type
apparently assumes the knowledge of combustion properties of fuels);
• The gas pressure monitoring within an accidental and nearby
compartments;
• Smoke, gas temperature, and gas concentrations' monitoring.
As we showed in Chapter I, the first two groups of information can be received by
directive inspection of a burning compartment by personnel. Therefore, objectiveness
and probability to receive this information is comparatively low. Though, the second and
the third groups of information are more reliable, and the probability to receive it is
higher, we can not except the case when this information would not be taken into
account. In other words, in our scenarios (tree of possible scenarios), we have to examine
all possible ways and combinations of all groups of objective information.
Taking into consideration all the above, we have created the tree of possible
scenarios of fire hazard analysis and appropriate specific decisions for fire suppression
(see Figure 9). As we see from Fig. 9, there are more than six possible scenarios of a fire
hazard analysis (the scenarios that are available in the case of receiving the six group of
information are drafted only approximately). Let's discuss the opportunities of each
possible scenario in detail.
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1. Scenario 1.
No objective information about the fire is available. In this case, no appropriate
models of fire development can be used. Therefore, our opportunities to analyze possible
development of the fire and probable damage of the ship and equipment are scanty.
Nevertheless, we have a chance to assess possible hazard and damage if we assume that
the fire is the worst among any possible. For instance, we may assume that all space of
the accidental compartment is burning, and the temperature in every particular point of
the space equals the flame temperature (7}«1300K). We also may assume that the
timing of this fire is infinite (r, = 00). Using this intently excessive numbers ("model")
of the fire together with the unsteady heat-transfer models of the equipment (see chapter
III.C), we may calculate the timing {the first approach) of functioning of the specific
equipment during a fire (see Fig. 8). In fact, for this scenario, all calculations and analysis
can be performed preliminary, because the chosen "model" of fire development does not
require current additional information about the actual fire.
2. Scenario 2.
This scenario assumes that we possess the first group of information, hence we
know the exact location of the fire in a compartment. Even though it is impossible to
apply a mathematical model of fire development, we may conduct specific calculations
and approximately determine safety (in some extent) and potentially dangerous zones in a
damaged compartment. Radzievski and Chnychkin (1987) showed that, in a closed
compartment beneath of the level where the source of fire located, the gas temperature is
almost unchanged during all period of fire development until its self-extinguishing.
Based on this notion, they argued that all space of a compartment beneath the flame
42
altitude is safety for the personnel and equipment with respect to the high temperature
impact [Radzievski and Chnychkin, 1987].
The size and location of comparatively safety and dangerous zones might be
determined by another way. According to equation (3.12), the ratio between both zones
depends on the ratio between current and initial oxygen concentrations. On the other
hand, it is known that the fire self-extinguishing occurs when the current oxygen
concentration decreases to the critical meaning 0.12-0.13. If we assume that initial
oxygen concentration equals regular atmospheric value, xo=0.232, then, from equation
(3.12), we can see that maximum size potentially dangerous zone (a zone of thermal
impact of the fire) is not more than 50% of entire volume of an damaged compartment.
The most interesting, that the size of this zone Vrmax does not depend on the type of
burning material, consequently, it might be preliminary estimated. Thus, we are able not
only to recognize comparatively safety and dangerous zones in a damaged compartment
(using [Radzievsky and Chnychkin, 1987]), but also to determine a maximum value of
the dangerous zone.
As we see, the second scenario is more powerful than the first one though its
abilities are also strongly restricted. It allows to determine approximately safety and
dangerous zones in a damaged compartment, consequently we have a chance to correct
our assessments with respect to the functioning of the equipment that were made on the
basis of the first scenario. In addition, we may develop specific rules how to rescue the
personnel that were not able to escape from the damaged compartment before its sealing.
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3. Scenario 3.
This scenario assumes that we have information of the first and second groups
(we know the place of the source of fire and specific types of the burning material and
equipment). Such a combination of objective information permits to increase (though not
very considerably with compare the second scenario) our assessing abilities. First, as in
the second scenario, we are able to recognize and estimate the locations and sizes of the
safety and dangerous zones within damaged compartment. Second, in some extent, we
can estimate the timing self-extinguishing the fire development, r„ (the first approach).
Because we know what type of material or equipment is burning, we may also
approximately estimate the firing surface (fire pool area), Af . In order to do that, we may






where xt is the oxygen concentration in time of self-extinguishing (equals 0.12-0.13).
This estimating the period of the fire is rather crude, but better then our assumption in the
first scenario (r, = °o ). Therefore, it is useful because it enhances our assessment the
timing of functioning the equipment in a damaged compartment (second approach).
Moreover, it allows to predict the largest possible duration of the fire from the beginning
until its self-extinguishing.
4. Scenario 4.
The scenario assumes that we have information of thefourth group, hence we can
observe the gas pressure in a damaged and nearby compartments. As we showed in the
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second chapter, monitoring the gas pressure and its rate in time considerably increase the
opportunity to estimate and predict principal characteristics of the fire. In this case, we
can examine and estimate such an important parameter as the scale of the fire, Sc, and
predict the timing of self-extinguishing the fire, T, (second approach). Estimating the
scale of the fire is crucial, because it permits to make a decision to suppress effectively
the fire by choosing an appropriate extinguishing tool. In Reference [Nikitin, Rodin,
1991], an example of classification of the fire in terms of its scale and selection of
appropriate methods and tools of the fire suppression was represented. According to
[Nikitin, 198?], if the maximum rate of the gas pressure in a damaged compartment
/7max < 0.5/ V , then the fire pool area A s is not more than 1.5-2.0m
2
. So, the scale and
hence the hazard of the fire is small. The appropriate decision might be:
• to inspect an accidental compartment by personnel for determining the fire
location;
• to put out the fire by portable and semi-portable devices (extinguishers).
If /?max < 2.0 / V , then the fire pool area is nearly 5m
2
. Knowing the volume of
the compartment, V, we can estimate the fire scale and hazard. Possible decision is
• To conduct quick inspection of the compartment for determining the fire
location and to suppress the fire by appropriate fixed fire -extinguishing
system.
• If the inspection is impossible or inefficient (the fire location is not
recognized), to apply the most powerful means of the fire suppression that
have extinguishing effect throughout entire compartment (for example, the
halon extinguishing system).
Finally, if p max > 2.0 fV , then the fire scale is rather dangerous. Our decision
must be fast and effective: without any preliminary inspection, to apply all possible
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means of fire suppression (fixed fire-extinguishing systems and even direct sinking the
firing compartment by the seawater).
A similar procedure (or schema) as an efficient tool for decision making during
fire fighting can be created for each ship or even for each compartment of ship where all
peculiarities of a compartment and means of the fire suppression would be taken into
account.
In addition to the scale of the fire, we have an opportunity to estimate more
precisely than in scenario 3 the timing of the fire development (the second approach). As
we showed above, in a sealed compartment, the maximum volume of atmosphere (the
air) that is able to pass through the combustion zone is nearly 50% of entire volume a
compartment V. On the other hand, it is known [see for example, Pomerantsev, (1986)]
that the amount of thermal energy which can be released in an air volume unit, qa during
combustion process is approximately the same for each carbon material
(qa ~3800kJ/m ). Because the rate of the gas pressure p in a compartment is
equivalent thermal energy released in each unit volume per unit of time, we can estimate
the entire period of the fire by the next equation:
T.-OSq.'P- * 0.5x3,800/p_= 1,900/p_ (3.17)
Monitoring the gas pressure and its rate allows to examine not only scale of the
fire and predict the timing of self-extinguishing. It also permits to observe current
particular phases of the fire development as well as success or failure of fire fighting
actions conducted by personnel. For example, if the rate of the gas pressure rate
increases, we can definitely conclude that the fire is spreading out and becoming more
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powerful and dangerous. If the gas pressure rate becomes steady (or quasi-steady), it
means that the fire has already stabilized and not propagated anymore. Finally, if the gas
pressure rate slows down, it definitely a signal that the fire has gone out. Monitoring the
gas pressure also provides the opportunity to recognize objectively the moment of fire
self-extinguishing by observing a specific gas pressure curve brake that is coincident with
self-extinction of the fire [Nikitin, 1998a].
5. Scenario 5.
This scenario assumes that information of the first and third groups is available.
In other words, we are able to recognize the location of the source of a fire within a
compartment and to monitor the gas pressure. (But we can not indicate what types of
materials or equipment are currently burning.) Obviously, it is possible to realize
completely scenario 4. In addition, because of knowledge about a location of the source
of a fire, we can recognize the volumes and location of the safety and potentially zones
within a damaged compartment more accurately than in scenario 2 and 3. Unlike in the
previous scenarios, we can determine not only extreme volumes of safety and dangerous
zones at the final moment of the fire development, but we are able to estimate and
observe the current meanings of these volumes in any unit of time. For example, we may
calculate the current volume of the thermal impact zone V? taking into account that this
volume is consistent with a current volume of atmosphere of a compartment which
currently has already passed through the combustion zone. Using specific combustion
property of the air qa and notion that a current total energy released by the fire equals the
area under the gas pressure curve (see Fig. 10), a current thermal volume might be
estimated by the next equation:
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v](p-p )dz V\(p-p )dr
V=^ = -* (3.18)
qa 3,800
If a damaged compartment is divided by the decks and walls into several
comparatively separated staterooms, cabins, etc., it is possible to indicate what exact
rooms are currently dangerous or safety. It might be provided by the notion that the heat
atmosphere of the fire will gradually propagate from the cabins located higher then the
others to those that located lower or so. Thus, in any current moment, we will know not
only the volume of the dangerous thermal zone, but also the cabins of a compartment
where the gas temperature is dangerous for personnel and equipment. It is clear such an
accurate estimation of the safety and dangerous zones within damaged compartment
would allow alleviate some excessive restrictions with respect the timing of functioning
the equipment that were conducted by the previous models (scenarios).
6. Scenario 6.
This scenario assumes availability of the first, second, and third groups of
objective information about the fire. In addition to what we had known in scenario 5, we
have possessed information of the types of currently burning materials. As a result, we
are able additionally estimate and predict some new important parameters of the fire
development:
• a fire pool area A s.
an average temperature schedule within a compartment during a fire.•
• temperature variations with time for specific zones and cabins of a
damaged compartment.
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In essence, we are able to apply the models and methods that were described in
paragraphs III.A-III.C of this chapter; therefore, from informative point of view, scenario
6 is the most powerful and accurate with respect CO capabilities to make command
decision for suppressing the fire and ensuring the survivability of ship.
7. Scenarios 7, 8.
All these scenarios assume availability to gather and use information of the fourth
group (with various combinations of information of the first three groups that were
discussed before). Advantages and disadvantages of the smoke, gas temperature, and gas
concentrations' monitoring we particularly discussed in Chapter I. This is powerful basis
for applying DCIS, conducting the minute control on the fire development, and command
decision making during a fire aboard. But this monitoring is quite expensive because it
requires tremendous amounts of different types of sensors that have to be placed
throughout all compartments of ship. It is possible and sometimes reasonable. But in
some extent, the efficiency of this cumbersome informative system is barely higher than,
for example, a system, which is based on monitoring a gas pressure in compartments,
personnel inspections, and reports. The capabilities of such system, we have described
by developing scenarios 1-6.
The entire picture that reflects alternative scenarios of the fire hazard analysis and
applied models for estimating and predicting a fire development is briefly represented by
the informative tree of the fire monitoring, hazard analysis, and command decisions (see
Fig. 9). This tree of possible scenarios reflect a notion that capability to assess an
emergent situation and to make an effective command decision heavily depends on
opportunities to gather and apply original and current information about specific
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parameters of the fire and the gas atmosphere in a damaged compartment. When
objective information is tiny or poor, the command decisions are uncertain and weak
(scenario 1,2). And vice versa, than more accurate and appropriate objective information
than more powerful, confident, and effective our analysis and command decisions, than
more successful the ultimate results of the fire fighting procedures (scenarios 4,5 and
higher).
E. CONCLUSION
First, based on the notion that during a fire aboard the opportunity of gathering
objective information is rather restricted, an appropriate mathematical model and
equations for estimating of fire development were described. The average temperature,
oxygen concentration, and gas density within a damaged compartment can be calculated
as functions of time during a fire development by means of corresponding analytical
formulas.
Second, a model and analytical formulas for approximate estimating and
predicting temperature in some specific zones (a thermal impact zone and a zone of
comparative safety) of a compartment were received. The model is based on the notion
that a volume of thermal zone within a damaged compartment, Vj, which is dangerous for
personnel and equipment, constantly grows during a fire. The value of this volume is
consistent with a current total volume of the compartment atmosphere, which has already
passed through a combustion zone of the fire. The maximum meaning Vt equals nearly
50% of entire volume of a compartment, V, and in some extent it does not depend on type
of burning materials and their combustion properties. This is an important statement
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because it permits to predict the dimensions of the dangerous and safe areas within a
compartment during the fire, and their extreme values.
Third, the models for estimating and predicting the timing of functioning a ship's
apparatuses and equipment should be designed. Because of thermal inertia, such models
should be concerned on estimating unsteady heat-transfer processes between external
temperature milieu of the fire and internal components of each specific apparatus that is
crucial for functioning the entire technical system. In fact, the timing of normal
functioning will depend on the moment when temperature of an examined component
raises up to critical meaning.
Fourth, unpredictability of a fire development, on the one hand, and distinctive
potential opportunities for taking objective initial and current information about its
principal parameters, on the other, require specific and flexible methods of the fire
estimating and predicting. Specifically, the fire peculiarities pre-determine multi-variety
of the fire modeling and hence multi-variety of possible scenarios of the fire hazard
analysis. Depending on availability and quality of initial and current information about
the fire and atmospheric conditions, an information tree ofpossible alternative scenarios
of the fire hazard analysis, its development, and command decisions were discussed.
This discussion has confirmed than more accurate and appropriate original and current
information about the fire than more powerful, confident, and effective command
decisions, than more successful ultimate results of the fire fighting procedures. This
discussion has also confirmed certain informative benefits of gas pressure monitoring for
fire hazard analysis and command decisions' support.
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IV. ACTUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DIAGRAM AND EFFICIENCY OF THE
GAS PRESSURE MONITORING FOR COMMAND DECISIONS DURING
A FERE ABOARD
Previous discussion about possible models and options of fire monitoring has
demonstrated benefits and flaws of different types of objective information about the fire
for efficiency of command decisions and effectiveness of the fire-fighting actions. In the
first approach, it was shown the advantages of the gas pressure monitoring for fire
modeling together with information technology application and consequently for entire
fire-hazard analysis and command decision support. In this chapter, the advantages or
possible disadvantages of applying the gas pressure monitoring in board DCIS fore
command decision support during a fire will be discussed. Specifically, in terms of cost-
benefit analysis, we will discuss our fundamental decision about whether to apply gas
pressure monitoring and relevant fire modeling in board DCIS for efficiency increase of
command decisions during a fire. This cost-benefit analysis will be conducted based on
the decision theory and chronological decision tree diagrams' design [Raiffa, 1970;
Lapin, 1991; Keeney and Raiffa, 1993].
A. COMMAND DECISIONS DURING A FIRE ARE THE DECISIONS
WITH MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES AND UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT
A procedure of command decision making during a fire is always complicated
and not obvious. This procedure is a sequence of some elementary decisions, which are
made gradually. Each subsequent decision depends on the current situation and success
or failure of implementing the previous command decision. In addition, and this is
crucially important, even if a commanding officer has enough information about a fire, it
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is not automatically means that a following decision would be trivial, because the entire
decision making procedure is conducted under pressure of multiple objectives and
priorities. For example, if a fire occurred and was detected, a commanding officer might
not order to use all possible ways of the fire suppression, because such a decision would
excessive, it might cause considerable damage of the equipment in a fire compartment
(by extinguishing agent), additional costs, or even failure of the other duties or combat
performances. So, each decision would be made after trade-off between alternatives and
objectives that are very often contradict each other.
On the other hand, because of the fire unpredictability and other aspects of
environmental uncertainty, each command decision and its realization (action) would
produce a spectrum of possible responses with some levels of probability. Thus, the
entire procedure of command decisions, following actions of personnel, and probabilistic
responses (events) of the environment shape a tree of possible actions and events that
might be described in terms of the decision theory concept.
B. SIMPLIFICATION OF THE FIRE-FIGHTING PROCEDURE, CHOICE
OF OBJECTIVES, AND DESIGN OF A DECISION TREE DIAGRAM
The entire procedure of the fire-fighting actions and command decisions is so
complex and multi-variant that it barely can be adequately described in terms of classical
decision theory. Therefore, this procedure should be simplified with respect to external
multiple objectives and real chronological tree as well.
There several alternative objectives that can be established by a commanding
officer (CO) of a ship when a fire occurs and fire-fighting actions are conducted. Among
them are:
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To suppress the fire and continue being underwater.
To suppress the fire and save the crew.
To rescue the crew and provide survivability of the ship.
To save the ship and to rescue the crew.
To accomplish a combat duty, to suppress the fire, and to save the crew
and the ship.
To minimize casualties of the crew and damage of the ship and its
equipment, and so forth.
From this list of objectives, we can see that depending on the chosen strategic
goal, the command decisions, priorities, and following actions of the crew might be
different. For our analysis, we have established the next objective (goal). If the fire
occurs, our priorities are to suppress the fire as soon as possible in order to minimize the
losses among personnel and damage of the ship and its equipment. Such objectives and
priorities are consistent with performance of common regular duties of a ship, that, in this
case, do not interfere with some specific combat operation priorities. Thus, the command
decisions of a CO and following actions will be recognized as a success if, after fire
suppression, the damage of the ship and its equipment is minimal.
In order to design a chronological decision tree diagram, we need to describe
possible alternatives that might take place as a result of command decisions and possible
outcomes of these acts. Analysis of the real fire accidents shows that, for the fire with
large and small scales, a sequence of the command decisions (acts) and outcomes
(events) are different. Moreover, the probabilities of the similar outcomes might be very
different too. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to design and discuss chronological
decision tree diagrams of the fire-fighting procedure for large-scale and for small-scale
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original fires separately. Such a division of our problem onto two parts not only
simplifies its formalization in terms of the decision theory, but also permits to discuss
some peculiarities that would be lost if we tried to design only single chronological
decision tree diagram.
First, let's discuss a design of chronological decision tree diagram in the case of
the large-scale fire emerge. Possible decision tree diagram can be described as shown in
Figure 11. The first crucial decision (act # 1) is whether to use a gas pressure monitoring
in DCIS for a fire scale detection or not. If we choose to use monitoring, then there are
two alternative outcomes of this decision:
• the fire scale was correctly recognized (favorable outcome) with
probability Pi.
• the fire scale was not recognized or was recognized incorrectly
(unfavorable outcome) with probability P2.
Each of these outcomes (events) induces necessity of making new decision about
what kind of fire suppression tool should be chosen (act # 2). Possible alternatives
(events):
• the fire extinguishing tool was appropriately chosen, and the fire was
suppressed with minimal costs and damages (final success). A probability
of this event isPj.
• the fire extinguishing tool was appropriately chosen, but the fire was not
suppressed.
Because, originally, it was a large-scale fire, unfavorable actions of the fire
suppression would produce the spread of the fire to nearby compartments and cause
additional damage and costs. Probability of this event is P4.
• the fire extinguishing tool was not correctly chosen (instead of fixed
system because of large-scale fire, the fire extinguishers were chosen).
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Nevertheless, the fire was suppressed. A probability of the event (though
it is tiny) is P5.
•
—the fire-extinguishing tool was chosen incorrectly, as a result, the fire
was not suppressed and began to spread. A probability of this event is P&
If the fixed extinguishing tool was appropriately chosen, but the suppression
actions were unfavorable (event-fork node # 8, Fig. 1 1), the fire might begin to spread and
threaten nearby compartments. Therefore, the next command decision that should be
made is to fill a damaged compartment with seawater in order to stop the fire (act # 3).
This command decision and its performance might have two options:
• fire is suppressed and the ship is able to survive (final "success").
Probability is P;(and Pu for another branch of the tree diagram).
• filling a damaged compartment by the seawater is unsuccessful, because it
worsens the entire situation aboard and causes new damage to the ship.
Probability is P8 (and P14).
Unfavorable outcome of the last decision (event-fork node # 14), eventually
derives the need to make one more decision (act # 4), a decision about abandoning the
ship that, in its turn, might produce at least two outcomes (options):
• abandoning might be accomplished favorably with minimal casualties and
damage (final "success"). Probability is Pu (and Pjs).
• abandoning might be conducted unfavorably with casualties and even the
ship's catastrophe (final "failure"). Probability is Pn (and Pi6).
Unfavorable outcome as a result of the choice of the fire extinguishers (act-fork
node # 5 and event-fork node # 10), will induce necessity to choose the fixed fire
suppression system (node # 12) which eventually might produce favorable and
unfavorable outcomes with probabilities P9 and P10 correspondingly. In essence, this
branch of the tree-diagram (from the node # 12 and so) is an exact replica of the branch
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from the node # 5 and so. The difference between these two branches is only the values
of the corresponding outcome probabilities and final expected payoffs, because the last
branch would be realized under worst conditions as a result of loosing time.
Refusal from the use of the gas pressure monitoring deprives DCIS an opportunity
to recognize the fire scale. In terms of the decision theory, it means that the
corresponding tree branch of the diagram (act-fork node # 26 and so) is absolutely the
same as the branch when the gas pressure monitoring produces a fault result (act-fork
node # 4 and so). In some extent, it is reasonable to assume that not only the structures of
the branches are equivalent, but also corresponding outcome probabilities are equal. So,
it is not necessary to describe this branch of the tree in detail (in Fig.l 1, this branch was
shown only particularly).
In the case of a small-scale fire, the chronological decision tree diagram can be
represented as shown in Figure 12. There are several differences between these two
diagrams (see Fig. 1 1 and Fig. 12). First, if the small fire scale was favorably recognized,
the next command decision (act-fork node # 5, Fig. 12) is to suppress the fire by the fire
extinguishers, and then, if these actions were not favorable, to apply the fixed fire
suppression system. In the case of the large-scale fire (Fig. 11), after favorable
recognition of the fire scale, the command decision is to apply the fixed fire suppression
systems. Second, if the small fire scale was incorrectly recognized, the next decision
would be to apply the fixed fire suppression systems that with great probability will
extinguish the small fire. But such action would be excessive and consequently
inappropriate. It will cause additional costs and other disadvantages, because of
unjustified damage of the equipment by the extinguishing agents. Third, though some
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sequences of acts and outcomes and entire tree diagram for the small fire scale are similar
to the diagram for the big scale fire, the probabilities of outcomes are different. Finally,
as it will be shown later, the final payoffs of the similar diagrams' branches will be also
different.
C. DETERMINING THE PAYOFFS AND ASSIGNING THE EVENT
PROBABILITIES
In determining payoffs, we assume that, during a fire fighting procedure, each
command decision, following actions of the crew, and outcomes will cause appropriate
costs that are consistent with volume of the damage and destruction of the ship produces
by the fire or by applying extinguishing agents. Our rough estimations show that
installation of the gas pressure monitoring system aboard together with DCIS will cost
not more than 0.5% of the entire cost of the ship (submarine). Suppose also that the cost
of the ship is $1 billion. Thus, the payoff of the decision to install the gas pressure
monitoring is $5 million. Depending on the scale of the fire, its duration, appropriate or
inappropriate fire scale recognition, favorable or unfavorable actions of the crew,
respecting payoffs (in terms of cash flows) would be different. In the case of the large-
scale fire, our rough estimations of the partial cash flows and determined payoffs are
represented in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 (columns # 4). In the case of the small-scale fire,
corresponding partial cash flows and payoffs are represented in Table 2 and Table 3
Assigning the event probabilities Pj-Pje for each case was also conducted
separately. Doing this, we followed the next general assumptions:
• appropriate and well-timed fire suppression action induces bigger
probability of success than inappropriate one.
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• the same action conducted sooner will cause bigger probability of the
favorable event, and vice versa.
• fire-fighting actions against the large-scale fire produces events with less
favorable probabilities than similar fire-fighting actions against small-
scale fire.
The assigned numbers of the event probabilities are represented in Table 4 and
Table 5 respectively.
D. DECISION ANALYSIS (STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
TREE DIAGRAM)
After determining payoffs and assigning the event probabilities, we may calculate
full probabilities and net payoffs for each possible final outcomes of the decision tree
diagrams. A full probability of each possible outcomes is a product of the conditional
probabilities P1-P16 that take place on corresponding prune of the tree-diagram. The
values of the full probabilities for each outcome and their expected payoffs are
represented in Fig.2-5 (columns # 3). Because the criterion of selecting the act with the
maximum expected payoffs was the Bayes decision rule, we calculated and inserted in
Table 2-5 (column # 5) the products of expected payoffs and full probabilities for each
possible outcome respectively.
In Table 8, total expected payoffs different cases are represented. As we can see,
in the case of the large-scale fire emerge, total payoffs are considerably less if we make
decision to apply the gas pressure monitoring in DCIS. The advantages of use this
monitoring for the small-scale fire are not so obvious though the total payoffs are also
less. Thus, we can definitely conclude that the decision to apply gas pressure monitoring
will be quite beneficial, especially in the case of the large-scale fire.
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E. CONCLUSION
First, a procedure of command decision making during a fire is always
complicated and not obvious, because it is conducted under pressure of multiple
objectives and the unpredictable character of a fire. Therefore, such a procedure might be
formalized in terms of the decision theory concept.
Second, based on this concept, the task of the cost evaluation of our decision to
apply the gas pressure monitoring for support command decisions and fire-fighting
actions was accomplished. Relevant decision tree diagrams were designed, and
corresponding payoffs and conditional event probabilities were estimated.
Third, structural and cost-benefit analysis of the decision-tree diagrams shows
that application of the gas pressure monitoring and relevant methods of recognizing a fire
scale, will be definitely beneficial for efficiency increase of the entire process of the
command decisions and the crew fire fighting actions as well. Conducted approximate
assessments of the expected payoffs show that, in the case of applying the gas pressure
monitoring, potential damages of the ship (with total cost $1 billion) from a single large-
scale fire will be at least $38.5 million less than for the case of not applying a gas





Our thesis examined opportunities for the application of information technology
(IT) through development of a new method of fire-scale and fire expansion monitoring
and mathematical modeling for the command decisions' support and providing the
efficiency of fire-fighting procedure. Based on accomplished research and analysis, the
next basic statements can be formulated:
First, despite of considerable progress with respect to IT implementation in board
damage control informative systems (DCIS) for monitoring a fire and support of
command decisions, some key-problems have not been solved. Among them are a
reliable fire-scale recognition; an objective observation, predicting, and control over a
fire development and success (or failure) of the fire-fighting actions. As a result, severe
procedure of visual inspection of a damaged (firing) compartment by personnel,
inappropriate command decisions about fire suppression, mistaken and inefficient crew
actions have taken place.
Second, in the case of closed (sealed) compartment or entire ship (aircraft or
space autonomous object) when internal atmosphere of the ship is separated from the
earth atmosphere, the gas pressure monitoring is a very perspective way which can
considerably enhance the effectiveness of the fire-fighting command decisions and
suppression actions as well. Our research and analysis shows that the gas pressure
monitoring and, particularly, monitoring the rate of the gas pressure variations during a
fire, is very reliable and objective tool for estimating a fire scale, determining a fire
ability to propagate through the ship, and detect a moment of the fire extinguishing.
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These obvious advantages of the gas pressure monitoring for the command decisions and
entire fire fighting procedure are combined with benefits of technical realization of
measuring the gas pressure comparatively measuring other physical parameters of the
compartment (ship) atmosphere: temperature or gases' concentrations. (The pressure
field in a closed compartment is not so irregular as the others fields; therefore, the gas
pressure measuring is much more technically simple and does not require to place
considerable amounts of sensors.)
Third, it was shown that though mathematical modeling of the fire development
is quite necessary, some objectives (such as the lack of initial specific information about
original physical condition of atmosphere and actual parameters of the fire) do not permit
to use the majority of the fire models in DCIS for fire hazard analysis and support of
command decisions. Nevertheless, our research and analysis shows that it is possible to
develop mathematical models that would be appropriate for DCIS. To demonstrate such
an opportunity, some specific mathematical models were designed and discussed in
chapter 3 . These models were developed in a way of using only that initial and current
information about atmospheric and fire parameters that are possible to observe during a
fire aboard.
Fourth, "unpredictability" of a fire development, on the one hand, and distinctive
potential opportunities for taking objective initial and current information about its
principal parameters, on the other, require specific and flexible methods of the fire
estimating and predicting. Specifically, the fire peculiarities pre-determine multi-variety
of the fire modeling and hence multi-variety of possible scenarios of the fire-hazard
analysis. Depending on availability and quality of initial and current information about
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the fire and atmospheric conditions, an informative tree ofpossible alternative scenarios
of the fire hazard analysis, its development and command decisions were discussed. This
discussion has confirmed than more accurate and appropriate original and current
information about the fire than more powerful, confident, and effective command
decisions, than more successful ultimate results of the fire fighting procedures. The
discussion has also confirmed considerable informative perspectives of the gas pressure
monitoring for fire -hazard analysis and command decisions' support.
Fifth, based on the decision theory, a cost-benefit analysis of the decision about
whether to apply or not apply a gas pressure monitoring in DCIS for support of command
decisions during a fire aboard was conducted. Relevant chronological decision tree
diagrams were designed, and corresponding payoffs and conditional probabilities of the
events were estimated. Formalization of so complicated and variable fire-fighting
procedure in terms of the decision theory concept has permitted to conduct structural and
cost benefit analysis of the command decisions during a fire and extract some interesting
specific results. For example, it was shown that dramatic effect on the entire
chronological decision-action procedure (tree diagram) and final success has the fire
scale and appropriate choice a fire suppression tool. Structural and cost-benefit analysis
also proved that application of the gas pressure monitoring in DCIS will not produce
considerable additional costs. At the same time, it will permit to save considerable costs







Figure 1 : Variations of temperature, oxygen, CO, and CO2 concentrations with time
during a fire in a closed compartment
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Figure 2. A fragment of a ship with a fire (accidental) compartment:
l~the hull of the ship (submarine).
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Figure 4. Variations of air pressure surplus (above initial value before the fire) with time
during the fire in steal closed compartment (F=46m3
,
burning material is diesel fuel
placed on the fire pool, /4s=0.22m2)
1—the fire pool at the center of the compartment (clearance between the fire pool and the
ceiling, /= 1.05m)
2—the fire pool by the flank wall, /=1.35m
3~the fire pool by the flank wall, /= 1.35m, the equipment occupied the compartment
space
4—the fire pool in the steel tube, /=2.9m
5—the fire pool by the front wall, /=1.35m
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Figure 5. Variations of maximum rate of air pressure increase, pm , with ratio of fire area
to volume of the compartment, A
s
IV
Straight line—calculated via equations (2.15) and (2.16)
The dots-experimental data (F=13.5, 32, 46, and 164m3)
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Figure 7. Temperature zones within fire compartment:
l~zone of thermal impact of the fire (dangerous zone)



































Figure 8. Estimating and predicting the timing of equipment functioning during a fire
aboard:
1 —temperature within a compartment
2--temperature regime of the most vulnerable element of the equipment unit # 1.
3—temperature regime of the most vulnerable element of the equipment unit # 2.






































































































Figure 12. Chronological Decision Tree Diagram for Small-Scale Fire
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APPENDIX B. TABLES
Table 1 . Basic conditions and results of the full scale tests with the fires in the closed
steel compartments (the burning material is diesel fuel
of test K m3 As, m2 As/V, 1/m •
seria Pm'Ws
1 46 0.22 4.78 156
2 46 0.22 4.78 209
3 46 0.22 4.78 174
4 46 0.22 4.78 177
5 46 0.22 4.78 192
6 46 0.22 4.78 176
7 13.5 0.12 8.89 323
8 13.5 0.21 15.6 907
9 13.5 0.37 27.4 1112
10 32 0.22 6.88 383
11 32 0.37 11.6 785
12 32 0.65 20.3 1121
13 164 1.03 6.28 370
14 164 1.8 11 700
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Correct fire recognition, appropriate





Correct fire recognition, appropriate
choice of the fixed system, unfavorable
suppression act, water filling the




Correct fire recognition, appropriate
choice of the fixed system, unfavorable
suppression act, water filling the
damaged compartment, unfavorable
result, favorable abandoning of the ship







Correct fire recognition, appropriate
choice of the fixed system, unfavorable
suppression act, unfavorable water filling
the damaged compartment, unfavorable






Incorrect fire recognition, inappropriate





Incorrect fire recognition, inappropriate
choice of the fire extinguishers,
unfavorable suppression act, choice of
the fixed extinguishing system, favorable
suppression





Incorrect fire recognition, inappropriate
choice of the fire extinguishers,
unfavorable suppression act, choice of
the fixed extinguishing system,
unfavorable suppression, favorable water








8 Incorrect fire recognition, inappropriate
choice of the fire extinguishers,
unfavorable suppression act, choice of
the fixed extinguishing system,
unfavorable suppression, unfavorable
water filling of the compartment,
unfavorable water filling of the
compartment, favorable abandoning (ship
was not sunk),








9 Incorrect fire recognition, inappropriate
choice of the fire extinguishers,
unfavorable suppression act, choice of
the fixed extinguishing system,
unfavorable suppression, unfavorable
water filling of the compartment,
unfavorable water filling of the
compartment, unfavorable abandoning of







Table 3. Large-Scale Fire (None Gas Pressure Monitoring)
#of
Out.














1 2 3 4 5
10 Incorrect fire recognition, inappropriate






11 Incorrect fire recognition, inappropriate
choice of the fire extinguishers, unfavorable
suppression act, choice of the fixed








12 Incorrect fire recognition, inappropriate
choice of the fire extinguishers, unfavorable
suppression act, choice of the fixed
extinguishing system, unfavorable










13 Incorrect fire recognition, inappropriate
choice of the fire extinguishers, unfavorable
suppression act, choice of the fixed
extinguishing system, unfavorable
suppression, unfavorable water filling of the
compartment, unfavorable water filling of
the compartment, favorable abandoning











14 Incorrect fire recognition, inappropriate
choice of the fire extinguishers, unfavorable
suppression act, choice of the fixed
extinguishing system, unfavorable
suppression, unfavorable water filling of the
compartment, unfavorable water filling of
the compartment, unfavorable abandoning






















1 2 3 4 5
1 Correct fire recognition, appropriate






2 Correct fire recognition, appropriate
choice of the fire extinguishers,
unfavorable suppression act, choice of





3 Correct fire recognition, appropriate
choice of the fire extinguishers,
unfavorable suppression act, choice of
the fixed system, unfavorable
suppression, favorable water filling of the
cmpt.
0.0144 -$1.44
4 Correct fire recognition, appropriate
choice of the fire extinguishers,
unfavorable suppression act, choice of
the fixed system, unfavorable
suppression, unfavorable water filling of









5 Correct fire recognition, appropriate
choice of the fire extinguishers,
unfavorable suppression act, choice of
the fixed system, unfavorable
suppression, unfavorable water filling of
the cmpt, unfavorable abandoning of the





6 Incorrect fire recognition, excessive









7 Incorrect fire recognition, excessive
choice of the fixed fire systems,
unfavorable fire suppression, water






8 Incorrect fire recognition, excessive
choice of the fixed fire systems,
unfavorable fire suppression, unfavorable









9 Incorrect fire recognition, excessive
choice of the fixed fire systems,
unfavorable fire suppression, unfavorable
water filling of the cmpt, unfavorable
abandoning of the ship (casualties and
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11 Excessive choice of the fixed fire systems,
unfavorable fire suppression, water filling






12 Excessive choice of the fixed fire systems,
unfavorable fire suppression, unfavorable
water filling of the cmpt,
0.0045 -$1.8
13 Excessive choice of the fixed fire systems,
unfavorable fire suppression, unfavorable
water filling of the cmpt, unfavorable
abandoning of the ship (casualties and







Table 6. The Event Probabilities for the Large-Scale Fire
Description of Event Probability
Fire scale was correctly recognized, Pi 0.9
Fire scale was incorrectly recognized, P2 0.1
After choosing the extinguishing system, the fire was favorably
suppressed, P3
0.8
After choosing the extinguishing system, the fire was not
suppressed, P4
0.2
After choosing the fire extinguisher, the large-scale fire was
suppressed, P5
0.05
After choosing the fire extinguisher, the large-scale fire was not
suppressed, P6
0.95
After unfavorable applying the extinguishing system and filling
cmpt., the fire was suppressed, P7
0.9
After unfavorable applying the extinguishing system and filling
cmpt., the fire was not suppressed, Ps
0.1
Favorable abandoning (node # 19), Pn 0.8
Unfavorable abandoning (node # 20), Pj 2 0.2
Favorable fire suppression (node # 1 5), P9 0.7
Unfavorable fire suppression (node # 16), P10 0.3
Favorable fire suppression (node #21), P13 0.8
Unfavorable fire suppression (node # 22), P14 0.2
Favorable abandoning (node # 24), P15 0.7
Unfavorable abandoning (node # 25), Pi6 0.3
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Table 7. The Event Probabilities for the Small-Scale Fire
Description of Event Probability
Fire scale was correctly recognized, Pi 0.8
Fire scale was incorrectly recognized, P2 0.2
After choosing the fire extinguisher, the fire was favorably
suppressed, P3
0.9
After choosing the fire extinguisher, the fire was not suppressed, P4 0.1
After choosing the fire extinguishing system, the small-scale fire
was suppressed, P5
0.95
After choosing the fire extinguishing system, the small-scale fire
was not suppressed, P6
0.05
Favorable fire suppression (node # 13), P7 0.8
Unfavorable fire suppression (node # 14), Pg 0.2
Favorable fire suppression (node # 15), P9 0.9
Unfavorable fire suppression (node # 16), P10 0.1
Favorable fire suppression (node # 19), Pn 0.9
Unfavorable fire suppression (node # 20), P12 0.1
Favorable abandoning (node # 21), P13 0.9
Unfavorable abandoning (node # 22), P14 0.1
Favorable abandoning (node # 24), P15 0.9
Unfavorable abandoning (node # 25), Pi6 0.1
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Table 8. Total Expected Payoffs (without costs of the DCIS), ml dollars
Large-Scale Fire Small-Scale Fire
Applying the Gas Pressure
Monitoring in DCIS
-$72,815 -$8,028






F--free volume of the compartment (the volume of air), m
;
Vu V2, V„ —free volumes of the nearby compartments, (m3 );
Fr—volume of the thermal zone in a damaged compartment, (m );
A>-ratio of specific heats Cp/cv (~);
p—pressure of air (Pa);
p -- rate of air pressure variation with time, (Pa/s);
• • •
p ] ,p 2 ,P„" rates °f a"" pressure variations with time in the nearby
compartments, (Pa/s);
H— low heat of the combustion of the fuel, (J/kg);
m — mass combustion rate, (kg/s);
qa— energy released in one unit of the air during combustion reaction of a carbon
fuel, (J/m3);
Ow— total heat transferred per unit time from the flame and air to the constructions
of compartment, (W);
Qf~ radiative part of heat transferred per unit time from the flame to the
constructions and wall of a compartment, (W);
m s — mass combustion rate per unit of the fire pool area, (kg/s m );
A s—fire (or liquid) pool area, (m2 );
Af= area of the flame surface, (m );
c =5.77 —radiation coefficient of a black body, (W m^K"4);
Tf—mean external temperature of flame, (K);
Tw— temperature of internal surface of the compartment, (K);
89
7^ — temperature of air in a compartment, (K);
r—burning fuel mass rate, (—);
hg— enthalpy of the fuel vapor, (J/kg);
K— combustion efficiency coefficient, (--);
Ff.w~ view factor between the flame surface and the constructions' surface of the
compartment, (--);
/— clearance between the fire pool and ceiling of a compartment, (m);
hf~ height of the flame, (m);
C— coefficient in equations 13 and 14, (s /kg);
m g\~ mass of the air (gases) flowing per unit time from an accidental
compartment to the nearby compartment # 1
,
(kg/s);
YYlgi— mass of the air (gases) flowing per unit time from an accidental
compartment to the nearby compartment # 2, (kg/s);
7?—universal gas constant, [J/(kg K)];
F—compartment internal surface area, (m ).
Greek Symbols
x — time, (s);
r„" fire duration from the beginning to self-extinction, (s);
77 — combustion efficiency, (—);
£ -- mutual emissivity, (--);
(X —heat transfer coefficient between the fire and internal surface of a
compartment, (W/m K);
£f ~ emissivity of the flame, (--);
£ — emissivity of the internal surface of the compartment, (--).
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